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ISSUE PAPERS
The Monopolization/Abuse Offense
By Spencer Weber Waller*
The search for the Holy Grail in competition law has been the
search for a single unified theory of harm in unilateral conduct cases.
That search appears to be ongoing in both the US and the EU. In the
early years of the Sherman Act, the United States Supreme Court
seemed to require either an outright violation of Section 1 or an
unambiguously immoral act by a firm with market power in order to
find unlawful monopolization or attempted monopolization under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.'
Later, the Second Circuit in Alcoa, with subsequent approval
by the Supreme Court, found a rebuttable presumption of unlawful
behavior upon proof of monopoly power alone, unless the defendant
could show that its monopoly was the product of superior skill,
foresight, or industry. 2 Even this slim escape hatch proved illusory in
practice since in the words of Alcoa,
"no monopolist monopolizes
3
unconscious of what he is doing."
The Supreme Court created its most enduring verbal
formulation in the Grinell case where it required proof by the
plaintiff of both monopoly power and some exclusionary or illegal
act on the part of the defendant.4 However, this too largely has
* Professor and Director, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola
University Chicago School of Law.
Compare Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911)
and United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
2 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). See
generally Spencer Weber Waller, The Story of Alcoa: The Enduring Questions of
Market Power, Conduct, and Remedy in Monopolization Cases, in ANTITRUST
STORIES

121 (2007).

3 Aluminum Co. ofAm., 148 F.2d at 432.
4 United States v. Grinell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
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proved to be an empty formulation, leaving the lower courts with
little guidance as what exactly is an unlawful or exclusionary act.
By the 1980s, the Supreme Court was ready to try again. In
the Aspen Skiing case, the Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict in
favor of a plaintiff where the defendant was shown to have sacrificed
present revenues and profits in a long term effort to exclude a rival
and where the defendant had no business justification for its
behavior. 5 Since then lower courts have struggled with whether the
"sacrifice" or the "no business justification" rationales are necessary
or merely sufficient conditions for the imposition of liability under
Section 2.
The most recent words in this struggle appear to be the very
differing approaches set forth by the Supreme Court in the 2004
Trinko decision 6 and by the D.C. Court in the 2001 Microsoft
decision. 7 In Trinko, the Supreme Court issued a narrow holding that
certain regulated behavior by local telephone companies was not
subject to Section 2 of the Sherman Act at all, but went on to offer
certain dicta about the general parameters of Section 2. The Trinko
court began with the truism that in order to: "safeguardthe incentive
to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found
unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive
conduct." 8 While it did not offer a general theory of liability under
Section 2, it did caution about applying Section 2 to either unilateral
refusals to deal with rivals or the essential facilities doctrine.
The Microsoft decision offered a broader framework for all
violations of Section 2 and applied that framework seriatim to a
sweeping variety of alleged misdeeds by the defendant. The
Microsoft framework is a variation on the rule of reason used in
Section 1 cases and asks the following series of questions:
First, to be condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist's act
must have an "anticompetitive effect." That is, it must
harm the competitive process and thereby harm consumers.
In contrast, harm to one or more competitors will not
suffice. "The [Sherman Act] directs itself not against

5 Aspen
6

Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.

398 (2004).
7 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F. 3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
8 Verizon Commc'ns Inc., 540 U.S. at 407.
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conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against
conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself."
Second, the plaintiff, on whom the burden of proof of
course rests, must demonstrate that the monopolist's
conduct indeed has the requisite anticompetitive effect. In
a case brought by a private plaintiff, the plaintiff must show
that its injury is "of 'the type that the statute was intended
to forestall,' "no less in a case brought by the Government,
it must demonstrate that the monopolist's conduct harmed
competition, not just a competitor.
Third, if a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie
case under § 2 by demonstrating anticompetitive effect,
then the monopolist may proffer a "procompetitive
justification" for its conduct. If the monopolist asserts a
procompetitive justification-a non-pretextual claim that
its conduct is indeed a form of competition on the merits
because it involves, for example, greater efficiency or
enhanced consumer appeal-then the burden shifts back to
the plaintiff to rebut that claim!False
Fourth, if the monopolist's procompetitive justification
stands unrebutted, then the plaintiff must demonstrate that
the anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs the
procompetitive benefitFalse
Finally, in considering whether the monopolist's conduct
on balance harms competition and is therefore condemned
as exclusionary for purposes of § 2, our focus is upon the
effect of that conduct, not upon the intent behind it.
Evidence of the intent behind the conduct of a monopolist
is relevant only to the extent it helps us understand the
9
likely effect of the monopolist's conduct.
In the European Union, the analysis of the abuse of a
dominant position begins with the text of Article 82 which offers
several illustrative examples of violations, but no over arching
principles. It reaches both exclusionary abuses as well as exploitive
abuses of a kind left untouched by Section 2. Although rarely used in
this fashion, Article 82 can thus be used to attack monopoly pricing
or discriminatorily high pricing by a dominant firm.
9 Microsoft, 253 F. 3d at 58-59 (Citations omitted).

170

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 20:2

General definitions and analytical frameworks are equally
hard to find in EU competition law. The lack of this kind of deep
analysis tends to be exacerbated by the civil law style decisions of the
EU courts in which they render unanimous and anonymous decisions
in the civil law tradition.
The most general definition of "abuse" goes all the way back
to the 1979 Hoffman-La Roche decision of the European Court of
Justice where it stated:
The concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the
behavior of an undertaking in dominant position which is
such as to influence the structure of market where, as result
of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the
degree of competition is weakened and which, through
recourse to methods different from those which condition
normal competition in products or services on the basis of
the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of
hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still
'' 0
existing in the market or the growth of that competition."
We currently await both the final results of the European
Commission's Article 82 reform project and the eventual rulings of
the CFI and then the ECJ itself in the Microsoft litigation. In the
meantime, the two systems have proceeded in a largely unsystematic
way to develop a body of case law dealing with different practices
undertaken under different circumstances. In so doing, both the US
and the EU have created a laundry list of rules dealing with such
topics as monopoly pricing, price discrimination, predatory pricing,
tying, bundling, exclusive dealing, refusals to deals, access to
essential facilities, etc. In individual cases, the US and the EU
sometimes have reached similar results and sometimes diverged
substantially. So far there has been neither a unified field theory of
unilateral conduct nor any reason to think the two systems will
strongly harmonize their overall approach or the legality of specific
practices by dominant firms.
For our discussion we will focus on whether there is the
meaningful possibility of a single theory of liability for unlawful
monopolization or the abuse of a dominant position and whether any
such theory can unite two important systems of competition law with
different histories, texts, and enforcement traditions. We will use
approaches to specific types of violations as examples of whether
10 Hoffman-La Roche, ECJ Feb. 13, 1979, 1979 E.C.R. 461 at

91.
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such harmonization of theory and practice is desirable and/or
achievable and use the Microsoft litigation in each jurisdiction to
predict the future of this vital but undertheorized area of competition
law.

